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Is the Clean Development Mechanism
Sustainable? Some Critical Aspects
by Dr. Christina Voigt*

T

Introduction

he Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) is rapidly
developing as an important element in international climate policy by providing a cost-effective means of complying with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. Defined in
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM provides for Annex
I Parties to implement project activities that reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) in non-Annex I Parties, in return
for certified emission reductions (“CERs”).1 The CERs generated by such project activities can be used by Annex I Parties
to help meet their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol
and can be traded on the international emissions trading market. Article 12 also stresses that
CDM projects should assist the
developing country host Parties (non-Annex I Parties) in
achieving sustainable development and in contributing to
the ultimate objective of the
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”).2
There are currently more than 900 registered CDM projects in forty-nine developing countries, and about another 2,000
projects in the project registration pipeline. The registered projects have resulted in 117,394,796 issued CERs.3 The CDM is
expected to generate more than 2.6 billion CERs, each equivalent to one tonne of carbon dioxide, by the time the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012.4
Therefore, the CDM is not only an innovative mechanism
that builds a bridge over the ‘North/South’ gap in the Kyoto
Scheme, but it also brings together private economic interests
and public climate policy by helping to channel private sector investment toward climate-friendly projects that otherwise
might not have taken place. A CDM project attracts substantial
transfers in financial and technological services to developing
countries while promoting climate protection and diminishing
the extent of national climate change mitigation in developed
countries.
Thus, it is crucial that a CDM project delivers real climate
benefits without causing other environmental damages, and
therefore upholds environmental integrity. Yet, how to ensure
the CDM’s environmental integrity is a legal challenge that
remains. Environmental impacts of the CDM have already led
buyers of carbon credits to increasingly try to protect them-

selves from liability for environmental damage caused by GHG
projects.5

Legal Challenges
The CDM is unique among the flexibility mechanisms of
the Kyoto Protocol in that it allows Annex I Parties to increase
their accumulated caps by obtaining emission credits generated
by investments in a CDM project in an uncapped, developing
(non-Annex I) Party. Each CER is an additional carbon tonne
which will entitle an Annex I, “investor,” Party to an equivalent increase in emissions from its territory, while remaining in
compliance.6
However, the lack of quantitative mitigation commitments
in CDM host countries and an
interest in a maximal number
of CERs resulting from a CDM
project create incentives for both
sides, CER-buyers/investors and
host states, involved in a CDM
project to inflate the amount of
CERs claimed.7 Therefore, the
more successful the CDM is at
generating CERs, the more an
Annex I Party can use those CERs to increase its territorial emissions above its cap, and the more important it is that each CER
corresponds to real, long-term, measurable emission reduction.
Apparently, with increasing volumes of CERs, the environmental performance of the entire Kyoto System depends upon the
environmental performance of the CDM. Environmental performance of the CDM depends on the demonstrated ability of
the CDM system to support the objective of the UNFCCC: to
stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at safe
levels.8 This ability of the CDM, coupled with avoiding other
environmental damages is usually referred to as “environmental
integrity.”9
The importance of environmental integrity has been made
obvious by the 2005 Meeting of the Parties (“MOP”) 1 when
adopting the Marrakech Accords (now titled Kyoto Rule Book).
In decision 2/CMP.1, “Principles, nature and scope of the mech-

The long-term, significant
reduction of GHGs is a
necessary condition for
sustainable development.

15

* Dr. Christina Voigt, LL.M., is a postdoctoral research fellow and lecturer in
environmental law at the University of Oslo, Department of Public and International Law, Norway. Dr. Voigt would like to thank the members of the research
group for natural resources law at the School of Law, University of Oslo, as well
as Markus Gehring, Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Richard Ottinger, Gerd Winter, and Durwood Zaelke for helpful comments to this paper.

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

anisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol,” the Parties emphasize that “environmental integrity is to be
achieved through sound modalities, rules and guidelines for the
mechanisms, sound and strong principles and rules governing
land use, land use change and forestry activities, and a strong
compliance regime.”10
In this Article, I will try to explore what this passage implies
for the CDM and attempt to highlight some aspects of the current design of the CDM that raise concerns about environmental
integrity.

Definition of
Environmental Integrity
Environmental integrity in general refers to the ability of
an environmental measure to reach its objective and purpose. It
therefore relates to the quality of the regime, its instruments, and
its institutions. In the context of the climate regime, the extent to
which the means are able to achieve the ultimate objective of the
UNFCCC, as stated in Article 2, is essential in considering the
environmental integrity of the entire regime.
With regard to the flexibility mechanisms, environmental
integrity will depend on their capacity to ensure that the Parties included in Annex I do not exceed their assigned amounts.
Emissions, reductions, and removals need, therefore, not only
be quantifiable by using the same standard worldwide, but also
real, complete, accurate, long-term, environmentally conservative, comparable, and verifiable.
Particularly in the climate regime, environmental integrity
is a requirement for the promotion of sustainable development
by a climate measure. The long-term, significant reduction of
GHGs is a necessary condition for sustainable development. In
other words, no development is sustainable if the issue of tackling climate change is left unsolved.

Environmental Integrity of the CDM
In the particular case of the CDM, environmental integrity
can be defined in a wider and a narrower sense. In its narrower
(or primary) sense, it is the demonstrated ability to approve projects and to certify emissions reductions that are real and additional, for example, reductions that would not have occurred
in the absence of the project, and to support projects that contribute to long-term reductions in GHG concentrations in the
atmosphere.11 Environmental integrity in a wider (or secondary)
sense means that other environmental concerns need to be taken
into account and negative impact avoided. Special concerns in
this respect relate to biological diversity protection connected to
land use, land use change, and forestry projects.12 In particular,
these concerns exist where CO2 sequestration projects (biomass
or forest sinks) result in large-scale plantations of mono-cultural
and/or non-indigenous tree species that could pose a threat to, or
destroy local ecological systems.

Some Critical Aspects
Additionality and Leakage
One of the key issues for the environmental integrity of
CDM projects is the additionality of emission reductions or
Winter 2008

removals.13 Article 12(5)(c) of the Kyoto Protocol provides that
CERs shall be certified if based on reductions that are additional
to any that would occur in the absence of the project.14 Additionality is a necessary requirement for making the CDM function as a mechanism to compensate for emissions that are not
being reduced domestically by Annex I Parties.15 If CERs are
created that represent emission reductions that would have happened anyway, then these “paper reductions” will undermine the
integrity of the Kyoto Protocol.
Each project participant must demonstrate the additionality of the project in the project design document (“PDD”). Each
project must describe the baseline scenario from which this
additionality is measured. This baseline scenario represents the
GHG emissions that would have occurred in the absence of the
project. Problematic in this context is the counter-factuality of
the baseline scenario: the project developer needs to investigate
what would have happened if the project had not taken place.
This scenario can lead to hypothetical assumptions, which help
to inflate the amount of CERs.
To counter such incentives, the project must be based on
a baseline and monitoring methodology applied to the project
activity. The Executive Board (“EB”), which is assisted by the
Panel on Guidelines for Methodologies for Baselines and Monitoring Plans (“Meth Panel”), are to approve the methodologies.16
However, the issue here is whether the EB and/or the Meth Panel
are adequately equipped to carry out this task. Concerns have
arisen with respect to the member’s capacity to carry this task
and to the financial budget available for this kind of work.17
The PDD must further include the project boundary and any
adjustments for leakage. This means that a project must calculate
all GHG emissions under the control of the project participants
that are significant and reasonably attributable to the project
activity. These must then be adjusted for net changes of greenhouse gas emissions outside of the project boundary, which are
measurable and contributable to the project activity.18
Additionality coupled with prevention of leakage helps to
address concerns that investments in the CDM could displace,
rather than replace, GHG-intensive activities. An example of
such leakage would occur if a CDM project reduced fossil fuels
where it meant to, but also resulted in increases elsewhere. The
challenge, however, is how to define “project boundaries” and
“emissions under the control of the project participant” in this
context. “Leakage” might easily be detected if it happens in the
same industrial sector or the same region, however, increases
can also occur across country borders. These emissions might
hardly be found to be under the control of the project developer,
and thus not calculable in the baseline-scenario.
In order to survive an “environmental integrity check,” a
CDM project would need to prove that its additionality does not
lead to increased emissions elsewhere or slow climate change
mitigation efforts. It is within the climate regime that a solution
to this situation needs to be found. Therefore, the design of the
CDM has to prevent projects that lead to a net increase in emissions, whether that is in the same sector, in other sectors, in other
regions of the same country, or in other countries.
16

The additionality criterion in its present state, despite being
crucial to the environmental integrity of the CDM, can create
adverse policy incentives to climate change mitigation. The
potential of CDM projects to generate much-needed investment
flows into a host country has led some developing countries to
back off from implementing more progressive energy or climate
policies and the respective legislation needed. These policies
and laws, if integrated into the baseline, would disqualify CDM
projects that aim at meeting these new standards or thresholds
because they no longer would be additional.19
In order to promote environmental integrity while encouraging progressive climate policies in these countries, a solution
to, and safeguard against, this disturbing situation must be found
within the climate regime.

Contribution to Sustainable Development
The contribution of the CDM to sustainable development
needs to be seen in terms of host country development, as
expressed as one of the CDM goals mentioned above. Given the
reference to the objective of the Convention and the role that climate change mitigation itself plays in sustainable development,20
any assessment of the CDM’s contribution must also recognize
the wider role projects and the mechanism itself can play as catalysts for sustainable development of host States.21
CDM’s contribution to sustainable development was subject to considerable debate during the negotiations of the Kyoto
Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords and is under improvement
still.22 In particular, host countries have been concerned about
their sovereignty and largely unwilling to accept externally determined sustainable development priorities imposed on them.23
This led to only marginal references to sustainable development
in the Marrakesh Accords, which leave the meaning of “sustainable development” undefined. Rather, under the climate regime,
it remains the host country’s sovereign prerogative to determine
whether a particular CDM project helps it achieve this goal.24
Thus, relatively little is achieved in terms of affecting the growth
pattern of developing countries.
A project is, in the absence of any alternative, considered
to contribute to sustainable development if it is congruent with
existing national development policies.25 This “subjective”
approach to sustainable development translates into curtailing
and challenging the potential of the CDM. Though, there are a
few concerns.
First, designing the CDM and meeting CDM project eligibility requirements present significant challenges because host
countries have different economic conditions, natural resources,
and development priorities. Thus, they have different perceptions about what is required to achieve sustainable development.
Selecting sustainable development criteria and assessing the sustainable development impact can therefore differ significantly
from one host country to another.
Despite several ideas about quality standards or indicators
of sustainable development,26 which provide some guidance on
what should be taken into account, in the end, it is currently the
host country’s sovereign decision to ascertain whether a CDM
project activity promotes its sustainable development targets.27
17

Therefore, the Designated National Authorities (“DNAs”) in
developing countries are tasked with issuing a Letter of Approval
attesting to the project’s contribution to their countries’ sustainable development.28 A CDM project can only be registered if
such affirmation is provided to the CDM Executive Board. This
leads to uncertainty and creates a disincentive for investment
decisions.
Second, while there is, without a doubt, a strong potential
for synergies between addressing environmental problems and
national development goals,29 there is also the danger that accepting congruency with existing development policies may not lead
to a change of benefits to sustainable development since most
existing national development policies lead to increasing GHG
emissions.30 Thus, the congruency requirement is not a high
threshold, if any at all, in terms of sustainable development.31

Which Path to Follow?
From the point of sustainable development, a low energy
path is, most likely, the optimal way.32 However, most development paths are likely to lead to increasing energy demands
and depend on the availability of energy resources to meet these
demands. It is unrealistic to assume that developing countries, or
developed countries for that matter, will in the near future change
to development strategies based on constant or declining levels
of energy consumption. Energy is fundamental to advancing the
economic and social dimensions of sustainable development.33
However, sustainable development requires that, different from
the scenario outlined in Figure 1, meeting increasing energy
demand must not go along with increasing CO2 emissions.
Figure 1: Energy-Related CO2 Emissions34
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In 1987, the World Commission of Environment and Development (“WCED”) noted that it is essential that demands be met
by energy sources that are dependable, safe, and environmentally sound.35 In particular the latter, but arguably all three criteria for such “sustainable energy supply,” require the decoupling
of energy supply from increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
Achieving sustainable development in developing, and
developed, countries, thus depends on more efficient energy use,
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reduction of energy consumption, and, importantly, the decarbonisation of their economies. Unless the impact of the CDM
spurs climate-friendly policies in developing countries, it will
promote only one of the CDM’s triple goals: the cost effective
compliance of Annex I countries with their emission reduction
commitments. However, it will not contribute to the ultimate
objective of the UNFCCC, as it would not assist non-Annex I
Parties in contributing to stabilizing GHG concentrations, nor
contribute to the sustainable development of non-Annex I Parties in any meaningful way.
The question is whether developing countries should be
accorded a privileged position when considering their sustainable development path. The WCED, in promoting the transition
to a sustainable energy era, suggested that traditional fossil fuel
use should be accepted in developing countries in order to realize their growth potential, while
developed countries should seek
to limit their uses of fossil fuel.36
This recommendation is problematic. Sustainable development does not require increased
fossil fuel consumption in developing countries. What it requires
are equal development opportunities, however, these depend
on the availability of energy resources in general, and not only
fossil fuels. To grant developing countries a preferential “right”
to use fossil fuels would also burden them with an obligation
to reduce emissions. Rather, sustainable development requires
avoiding such a burden from the outset.
Sustainable development in developing countries means
enabling them to achieve higher levels of economic development with much reduced levels of greenhouse gas emissions and
environmental damage. Copying the negative example of industrialized nations is certainly not sustainable.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out the
inconvenient truth that, “energy security cannot be achieved
without recognition of the environmental consequences of
energy consumption, ‘especially our currently overwhelming and deeply entrenched reliance on fossil fuels.’”37 He said
“the need to increase energy supplies in order to fight poverty
could entail a vicious circle but added that this does not need to
happen” because energy supplies do not depend on fossil fuels
only.38
In order to move toward sustainable development, developing countries also must systematically decrease the carbon intensity of their economic development through renewable energy
systems, enhanced energy efficiency, and introduction of clean
technologies, with the financial and technological assistance of
industrialized countries. Thus, with respect to developing countries, the purpose of the CDM can be understood as assisting in
the transformation of their economies. Therefore, the CDM is a
crucially important global financial vehicle to catalyze national
transitions toward sustainable development in host countries

by increasing “green investment” flows into energy supplies,
transportation, and other industrial sectors.39 In this sense, it
is evident, as the acting head of the UN Climate Change Secretariat stated, “that the Kyoto Protocol is making a significant
contribution towards sustainable development of developing
countries.”40

Reality
The reality of CDM projects has so far been quite different
from their initial conception.41 As has been noted, almost all proposed and approved projects to date have primarily focused on
maximizing the generation of CERs instead of focusing on sustainable development.42 Thus, three contentious issues related to
carbon dioxide capture and storage (“CCS”), HFC-23 projects,
and forest conservation, arose.43
First, including CCS projects aimed at capturing CO2
emissions from industrial
sources and subsequently storing the gas underground or in
the sub-seabed of the oceans in
the scope of the CDM raises not
only complicated technological
questions with regard to ensuring permanence and monitoring, but also legal questions as
to whether the injection of CO2
in geological formations should count as a non-emission, emission reduction, or carbon sequestration.44 It also raises more
fundamental points as to the contribution to sustainable development of such projects. Critics allege that this kind of technological advance channels substantial research and development into
end-of-pipe technological fixes without contributing to longterm benefits to low-carbon intensive technological development. Though in fact, it might actually delay the transition from
fossil fuels to more sustainable energy systems.45 The Member
States of the Kyoto Protocol confirmed that
carbon dioxide capture and storage in geological formations should lead to the transfer of environmentally
safe and sound technology and know-how, Noting that
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special
report on carbon dioxide capture and storage provides
a comprehensive assessment of the scientific, technical,
environmental, economic and social aspects of carbon
dioxide capture and storage technologies as mitigation
options.46
However, it was also recognized that “there remain a number of unresolved technical, methodological, legal and policy
issues relating to carbon dioxide capture and storage activities
under the clean development mechanism” and “that there is a
need for capacity-building on carbon dioxide capture and storage technologies and their applications.”47 It is therefore timely
and necessary to place a wider assessment of CCS and sustainable development on the research agendas.
Second, another challenge to the promotion of sustainable
development by the CDM concerns the proposed inclusion of

The reality of CDM
projects has so far been
quite different from their
initial conception.
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HFC-23 projects. HFC-23, a greenhouse gas listed in Annex
A of the Kyoto Protocol, is a by-product in the production of
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC-22), an ozone-depleting gas
regulated under the Montreal Protocol. Incineration of HFC-23
at existing production sites is already an accepted and practiced
CDM project, generating low cost CERs ($0.50 per tonne of CO2
equiv.). Expanding the scope of CDM projects to new incineration sites could create the perverse incentive to increase the
production of HCFC-22 to generate larger amounts of HFC-23.
Sustainable development is further undermined by the fact that
HFC-23 projects provide no technology transfer to developing countries and the low cost CERs from these projects could
actually lead to outpacing other high-quality projects. Again, no
final decision has been taken on this issue and the MOP1 asked
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
(“SBSTA”) for further elaborations.48 Also, it is recommended
that the discussions around this
issue seriously consider the
impacts on sustainable development due to the extension of
such projects.
Third, one of the major
omissions of the current design
of the climate regime is a plan
for reducing emissions from
deforestation in developing
countries and accounting forest conservation activities. A proposal by Papua New Guinea
and Costa Rica submitted to the 11th Conference of Parties
(“COP”)/MOP1 in 2005 seeks to include forest conservation
activities under the CDM or, alternatively, suggests elaborating
an optional Protocol to the Climate Convention. Yet, at COP13/
MOP3 held in Bali, there was still no final decision made regarding the role for avoided deforestation in the CDM. Thus, forest conservation, avoided deforestation, and accounting for both
will be dealt with as part of the post-2012 package. Still, the
inclusion of forest conservation projects could bring about the
win-win situation envisaged by sustainable development, where
economic value is attached to the protection of ecological assets.
For developing countries, CDM benefits from “avoided deforestation” could bring about social and economic improvements via
the transfer of environmentally sound technologies, in this case
ones not directly linked to the project, as well as wider environmental benefits, such as biodiversity protection.

To meet the requirements of sustainability, a CDM project
with adverse trade ramifications will need to demonstrate an
ability to overcome the still existing obstacles and shortcomings
of the Kyoto/Marrakech system.
The legal review of CDM projects, whether it takes place
under the compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol,49 an international arbitral tribunal,50 or the WTO Dispute System, will
supposedly establish a definition of sustainable development
requirements under the CDM. Regardless, it is important that
climate law and practice construe a coherent understanding of
sustainable development. While searching for the conceptualization and definition of sustainable development as an external
tributary into international climate law, the converse normative
flow might be at least as valid and probable, and perhaps more
significant in the long run.51
If sustainable development
is to be seriously pursued, CDM
projects will need to go beyond
more immediate impacts and
provide “long-term benefits” as
required by Article 12(5) of the
Kyoto Protocol. However, those
immediate benefits are equally
necessary. No long-term benefits can be attributed to the CDM
if it does not lead to real, measurable, and additional emission
reductions.52
The benefits generated by CDM projects may lessen reliance on carbon-intensive development. An analysis of sustainable development benefits accruing from CDM projects has
identified the following advantageous impacts: direct financial
incentives for proving the competitiveness of new technologies
for energy reduction, renewable energy generation, and increase
of energy efficiency, such as sustainable energy technologies;
development of supporting policy initiatives; increased understanding and acceptance of the importance and application of
sustainable energy technologies; dissemination of best-practice
techniques; strengthening of local institutional, financial and
technological capacity; increased and sustainable foreign investment; and increased access to sustainable energy services.53
Arguably, the most sophisticated analytical methodology
for identifying sustainable CDM projects is the proposed Gold
Standard, though other approaches exist.54 The Gold Standard
aims to ensure that CDM projects deliver real emissions reductions and clear contributions to sustainable development. The
criteria established are divided into three screens: the project
type, additionality and baselines, and sustainable development.
In regards to the latter particularly, the Gold Standard creates
a sustainability matrix, in addition to an environmental impact
assessment and stakeholder consultation. The matrix aims at
assessing a project’s contribution to sustainable development
based on its environmental, social, and economic impacts.55 The
key variables are assessed on the basis of on-site measurement,
existing data, and stakeholder consultation, and can score nega-

The benefits generated
by CDM projects may
lessen reliance on carbonintensive development.

Safeguards
Sustainable development must be clearly defined, and seriously and actively pursued through the CDM. Ensuring the integrity of the CDM with regard to the sustainable development paths
of host countries, demands strong safeguards. However, no such
safeguards exist for ensuring sustainable development. Despite
the above-proposed relatively straightforward definition of sustainable development in a climate context, for example, where
economic growth is decoupled from GHG emission growth, the
climate regime has yet to embrace this understanding.
19
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tive or positive. If the overall contribution is positive and nonnegative in all key components, then a project is considered as
contributing to sustainable development.
While the Gold Standard certainly is laudable, its success
will depend on its acceptance by project developers, host and
investor countries, and the multilateral climate regime, particularly the Executive Board. So far, it has acquired a closer and
more specific understanding of sustainable development. The
Gold Standard, together with other approaches to identifying
“sustainable” CDM projects,56 helps to clarify the substance of
sustainable development not only in the particular context of
CDM projects, but also beyond this mechanism. The identified
criteria and components, if they are accepted and used to guide
further project development, would reflect the understanding of
the international community, both North and South, of sustainable development. This understanding could be decisive if compliance with WTO norms were at stake.

Procedurals
Additionally, procedural safeguards of direct contribution of CDM projects to sustainable development in developing countries, more specific requirements on sustainable impact
assessment, public consultation and participation, and benefit
sharing57 have yet to be included in the CDM regime.58

Impact Assessment
As with the response to sustainable development indicators,
the idea of a mandatory environmental and sustainable impact
assessment for all CDM projects was seen as an infringement on
the sovereignty of potential host States. As a result, the final language of the agreement is weak, requiring nothing more than an
analysis of environmental impacts only if the host country makes
it mandatory for the project to be approved.59 The CDM Modalities and Procedures do not provide for a situation where the host
country does not have any laws on environmental impact assessment. However, if stakeholders have concerns about the local
environment or the social impact of a CDM project, then the
project should be evaluated under the highest international environmental and social assessment procedures and standards.60
However, the more stringent the rules on environmental and
sustainable impact assessment are, the more costly CDM projects might become. Since a host country benefits from a CDM
project, the absence of harmonized international rules may create an incentive for the host country to refrain from insisting on
a thorough impact assessment, in order to make its own market
attractive for CDM projects. “The CDM’s geographical flexibility,” warn Meijer and Werksman, “should not become a means
of channelling projects to host countries with the lowest environmental standard.”61
Internationally harmonized rules on environmental and
sustainable impact assessment of a CDM project would counter
such a perverse incentive. In order for a CDM project to pass a
sustainability test, they might, indeed, be necessary. Still, such a
test would evaluate the circumstances of a particular CDM project. In this case, it needs to be shown that the environmental and
sustainable impacts were thoroughly assessed.
Winter 2008

Public Participation
Involvement of stakeholders, defined as “the public, including individuals, groups or communities affected or likely to be
affected” by the CDM project,62 gives an opportunity to a wider
circle to comment on CDM projects at various stages of the project cycle. The modalities of the CDM require certain types of
information to be made public. Public participation could lead
to benefits in regards to environmental integrity and sustainable
development. Local communities and NGOs could influence
project design as their knowledge of local conditions might be
of particular value, thus making it easier for project developers
to recognize community needs and gain public support, and to
avoid delays, financial risks, local unrest, or legal action.
So far, stakeholder involvement requirements are only of a
procedural character. Comments from the public must be invited
and compiled and form an official input as part of the validation
and registration process of a project. However, the concerns of
stakeholders are not required to be substantially reflected in the
project development. Again, these restrictions on direct public
involvement resulted from the unwillingness of countries with
different approaches to public participation to agree on harmonized standards.63
However, the requirements of environmental integrity and
sustainable development may demand a stronger commitment
to stricter and harmonized standards for and more direct influence of public involvement.64 The reference to international
standards for public participation would prevent a “race to the
bottom” toward countries with low or no regulation on public
involvement.

In Sum
Despite the fact that it is the stated goal of the CDM to
achieve the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and to assist nonAnnex I countries in developing sustainability, the present regulatory framework remains somewhat rudimentary in setting up
and standardizing essential substantial and procedural requirements for meeting these goals. Therefore, the rather pragmatic
and fragmented approach taken so far to ensure the CDM’s environmental and sustainable integrity will need to be replaced by a
stronger, harmonized regulatory framework.

Conclusion
Whether the CDM will provide a basis for future multilateral climate policy depends on the willingness of nations to
commit themselves to the deeper emission cuts that, as scientific
evidence suggests, are necessary.65 Discussions about the CDM
during the negotiations of COP13/MOP3 in Bali in December
2007 signified the considerable potential of the CDM to bring
about consensus on the terms of global climate policy at some
point in the future.
UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, noted at this
event:
The CDM has been the focus of intense scrutiny, and
rightly so, by those who wish to ensure the mechanism’s environmental integrity and contribution to
sustainable development, as well by those who want
20

to ensure cost effectiveness. The conclusion that we
can draw, looking back from this milestone, is that the
CDM is delivering what it was meant to deliver—emission reductions and development. What’s more, it has
shown that it can evolve, adapt and improve.66
This positive conclusion will also be subject to scrutiny
and criticism in the future. Despite the achievements, much still
needs to be done in order to secure sound environmental outcomes of the CDM.
Whether the CDM is going to play an important role in any
post-2012 agreement will depend on the CDM’s ability to meet
its triple goals: to assist non-Annex I Parties in achieving sustainable development, to contribute to the ultimate objective of
the Convention, and to help Parties included in Annex I achieve
compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments.67

Still, the increasing interest in the CDM has spread to nonKyoto countries as well. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative of seven U.S. states, for example, envisages a cap-and-trade
system to be in place by 2009. The plants covered by the scheme
will presumably be allowed to use “offset credits,” emissions
reductions achieved outside the electricity sector. Such credits
could be “born in the USA” following similar rules as those
from projects generating emissions reduction under the CDM.
However, the plan envisages that under certain conditions, they
may also stem directly from CDM projects.
The implications for the environmental integrity of the CDM
should non-Kyoto Parties be allowed to receive CERs are yet to
be assessed. While the interest in the CDM is steadily increasing, so are the challenges to ensuring its environmental integrity
and its contribution to sustainable development.
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